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Abstract 
Multi-sided platforms such as exchanges, search engines, social networks and software 
platforms create value by assembling and serving communities of people and businesses.   
They generally come into being to solve a transaction problem that prevents agents from 
getting together to exchange value. An essential feature of these platforms is that they 
promote positive externalities between members of the community. But as with any 
community, there are numerous opportunities for people and businesses to create negative 
externalities, or engage in other bad behavior, that can reduce economic efficiency and, in 
the extreme, lead to the tragedy of the commons.  Multi-sided platforms, acting selfishly to 
maximize their own profits, often develop governance mechanisms to reduce harmful 
behavior. They also often develop rules to manage many of the same kinds of problems 
that beset communities subject to public laws and regulations.  They enforce these rules 
through the exercise of property rights and, most importantly, through the bouncer’s right 
to exclude agents from some quantum of the platform including prohibiting them from the 
platform entirely.  Private control is likely to be more efficient than social control in 
dealing with negative externalities on platform communities because the platform owner 
can monitor bad behavior more closely and deal with this behavior more expeditiously than 
a public regulator. The courts and antitrust authorities should exercise caution in finding 
anticompetitive exclusion when that exclusion is conducted as part of a governance 
mechanism for dealing with bad behavior of some platform users that harm other users. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
If you win an auction on eBay but do not get the good, or the good is 
not what was advertised, you can complain to the e-commerce site in 
addition to giving the merchant a low rating.  The site may decide to punish 
the merchant, including prohibiting them from ever selling again on eBay.  
Merchants receive protections too.  If a consumer wins an auction, she is 
supposed to pay for the good. eBay prohibits a consumer from bidding in 
multiple auctions for similar goods because if she wins several auctions she 
will likely renege on all but one.1 
This article examines how multi-sided platforms such as eBay limit 
bad behavior—or more precisely negative externalities—among their 
customers.  A multi-sided platform creates value by helping two or more 
different types of users interact with each other.2  Users can be people or 
businesses and may not pay anything to use the platform.  It is well known 
that positive externalities are central to these platforms.3  When different 
types of users are brought together they may be able to engage in mutually 
beneficial exchange.  That is the case with the person who wants to sell 
something on eBay and the person who wants to buy it.  Where a user on 
one side realizes more benefits from a platform that has more users on the 
other side, a platform may have positive network effects.4   
The roles of negative externalities, and the governance systems that 
platforms have developed to deal with them, are less well understood. Yet 
the governance of bad behavior among members of platform communities 
is a worthy subject of attention for several reasons.5  
                                                
1 For a summary of the rules for buyers and sellers on eBay see Rules & Policies, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/overview.html (last visited August 1, 2011). 
2 See Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Market, 1 J. 
EUROP. ECON. ASS’N. 990 (2003). 
3 See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with 
Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMP. POL’Y. INT’L. 151, 154 (2007). 
4 As Rochet and Tirole explain positive externalities for multi-sided platforms may result from 
either or both (a) positive externalities in use (which do not depend on the number of users on either 
side) and (b) positive network effects (which depend on the number of users).  For example, a 
cardholder and a merchant jointly benefit from being able to use a card (externality in use) but both 
benefit if there are more users on the other side (positive network externalities). See Jean-Charles 
Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Market: A Progress Report, 3 RAND J. ECON. 645, 647 (2006).   
5 Rochet and Tirole, id., appear to be the first to identify the role of the platform as a regulator 
and platform regulation. Also see David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial 
Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMP. POL’Y. INT’L. 151, 163 (2007). 
Boudreau and Hagiu present a detailed analysis of platform regulation and highlight the fact that 
platforms leverage a wide variety, and nuanced set, of instruments to maximize value. See Kevin J. 
Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, Platforms Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators in Annabelle 
Gawer, eds, Platforms, Markets, and Innovation 163-189 (Imperial College Business School, 2009).  
Boudreau and Hagiu treat all non-price instruments used by platforms as a form of regulation 
concerning access and interactions and as solution to market failures (in the sense that if these 
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First, although multi-sided platforms have existed for thousands of 
years, they are becoming an increasingly important part of the fabric of the 
economy.  The development of the Internet and the web has facilitated the 
creation of these platforms and some of these platforms have become global 
businesses quite rapidly.  For example, Facebook, which started in 2004, 
has more than 750 million active users worldwide, supports more than 500 
thousand applications, and had advertising revenue in 2010 of more than 
$1.8 billion.6  Understanding key aspects of how these platforms work helps 
in numerous contexts ranging from business to litigation. 
Second, many of these platforms have developed governance 
regimes that range from rudimentary to sophisticated.  These private 
regimes include rules, standards, detection, penalties, adjudication, and 
other elements found in the governance of polities.  The same lens of law 
and economics that has helped elucidate public legal regimes is helpful for 
examining private legal regimes.  This learning can help guide the 
development of more efficient governance regimes for platforms.   
Third, the ability of platforms to enforce rules concerning negative 
externalities rests on being able to penalize and ultimately exclude members 
of the community.  That naturally leads to disputes that sometimes end up 
before courts or regulatory authorities.  Indeed, platforms appear to be 
increasingly subject to antitrust inquiries focused on whether adverse 
actions taken against certain types of platform users are anticompetitive.  
These issues arise particularly when penalties are levied against platform 
users that provide services that compete, or might compete, with those 
provided by the platform.  Many of the current antitrust complaints against 
Google, for example, involve companies that complain that their businesses 
have been harmed as a result of reductions in their search ranking and that 
they provide vertical search services in competition with Google.7  
                                                                                                                       
strategies were not employed there would be a decrease in social surplus) and therefore consider a 
multitude of strategies for addressing positive and negative externalities. The present article focuses 
narrowly on the existence of negative externalities among platform users and the use of governance 
systems to deal with this bad behavior.  It sees these practices as analogous to the governance 
systems for communities, clubs, and other similar entities. The analysis in this article is loosely 
related to the framework put forward by Lior Jacob Strahilovetz, Information Asymmetries and the 
Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. LAW REV. 1838 (Aug. 2006). He argues that property rights include 
several subordinate rights that enable private businesses to deal with information asymmetries and 
examines the extent to which private property rights and public governance systems are substitutes.  
This article adopts his framework of subordinate property rights but then examines how these rights 
facilitate the development of private governance systems for multi-sided platforms that, like polities, 
must govern a community of members who may interact positively or negatively with each other. 
6 Facebook, Statistics, online at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited 
July 15, 2011). Advertising revenue from Jolie O’Dell, Facebook’s Ad Revenue Hit $1.86B for 2010, 
Mashable (Jan. 17, 2011), online at http://mashable.com/2011/01/17/facebooks-ad-revenue-hit-1-
86b-for-2010/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
7 See Leo Cendrowicz, The E.U. Probe: Is Google Rigging Its Search Results?, Time 
(December 2, 2010), online at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2034138,00.html  
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Understanding the role of rules in policing negative externalities can help 
distinguish pro-competitive from anti-competitive business practices of 
platform owners.   
After providing a brief introduction to multi-sided platforms, 
Section I situates the governance of negative externalities in the larger set of 
practices in which multi-sided platforms engage to maximize the value they 
generate for their communities as well as for themselves in the form of 
profits.  Section II describes sources of negative externalities and relates the 
problems faced by multi-sided platforms to polities as well as other 
businesses that must deal with negative externalities created by their 
customers.  Section III examines the governance methods platforms have 
developed to manage these problems. It draws on research concerning the 
business practices of multi-sided platforms in a diverse set of industries and 
over time.  Section IV provides detailed examinations of four economically 
significant industries that highlight platform governance: social networks, 
stock exchanges, search engines, and software platforms.  Section V 
analyzes the legal and policy issues that arise from disputes involving 
platform governance. It considers the distinction between efficient 
regulation of negative externalities and anticompetitive exclusion as well as 
the use of social versus private control over negative externalities in 
platform communities.  
 
 
I. MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING VALUE 
 
eBay creates value through the well-known process of exchange.  
An individual finds an antique sewing machine in their attic but places little 
value on it.  Another individual collects antique sewing machines.  eBay 
provides a platform for those two individuals to find each other and make a 
trade.  The collector pays money to the sewing machine owner and the 
collector gets the sewing machine.  They are both better off as a result.  The 
sewing machine owner could have sold his machine to an antique store and 
the collector could have gone to antique stores to find the sewing machine. 
The e-commerce platform can provide a more efficient means of commerce 
in antique sewing machines because it can aggregate the demand of many 
                                                                                                                       
(last visited August 23, 2011); Companies Ask EU Commission to Step in on Google Search Ranking 
Complaint, ITProPortal (February 24, 2010), online at 
http://www.itproportal.com/2010/02/24/companies-ask-eu-commission-step-google-search-ranking-
complaint/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2011); Claire Cain Miller, Texas Probes Google on Ranking of 
Search Results, The New York Times (September 3, 2010), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/technology/04google.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1314113487-
4SfkO0V/SuFxNfcRMdHkbQ (last visited August 23, 2011); Kinderstart Sues Google Over Lower 
Page Ranking, USA Today (March 19, 2006), online at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-03-
19-google-kinderstart_x.htm (last visited August 23, 2011). 
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antique sewing machine owners and many buyers and help bring them 
together to engage in trades. 
All two-sided platforms exhibit these same features.  There are two 
types of users that can generate value by coming together.  That could be a 
man and a woman who are looking for companionship, a sender and 
receiver of money, a mobile software application developer and a mobile 
phone user, a search engine user and an advertiser, or many other 
combinations.  The platform may provide a number of services to reduce 
the transactions costs for these users to come together and to exchange 
value.  Those services could include facilities to search and match users, to 
figure out exchange values, and to settle transactions. 
The two types of users do not necessarily need to value each other. 
It is sufficient that it is possible to create net value by putting them together.  
A company may value presenting advertising to a consumer but the 
consumer may be indifferent to the advertising or even willing to pay to 
avoid it.  So long as the value of presenting advertising to the consumer is 
greater than the cost to the consumer of receiving it, there are potential 
gains to trade.  The role of a platform for advertising-supported media is to 
“pay” the consumer to be exposed to advertising by providing content.  In 
effect, the media platform owner uses some of the money that the advertiser 
is willing to pay to reach a user to fund content creation that incentivizes 
users to be exposed to advertising in return for “free” media content. 
In the canonical model of two-sided platforms, the demand 
functions for at least one group of users depend on these users being able to 
access and interact with the members of another group of users.  In most 
cases outside of advertising, the two groups are complementary to each 
other.  In these instances, the platform owner maximizes profit by choosing 
prices and other strategic variables that recognize the interdependences.  An 
extensive economic literature examines the characteristics of profit-
maximization by platform owners, competition among platforms, and the 
dynamics of platform entry and growth.8 
Some multi-sided platforms have more than two groups of agents.  
Facebook, for example, is four-sided.  It is a communications platform for 
senders and receivers of information.  This communications platform is also 
open to advertisers who want to reach the people that are using Facebook to 
communicate with each other.  It is further made available to entrepreneurs 
who develop software applications—such as social games—that run on 
Facebook.  There are interdependencies among these four groups of 
                                                
8 See E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 AMER. ECON. REV. 1642, 
(2010). Weyl presents a general framework that encompasses and extends the earlier work by Rochet 
and Tirole and by Armstrong. See Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Market: A 
Progress Report, 3 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668 (2006). 
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economic users. 
Most of the economic literature has focused on the pricing policies 
of multi-sided platforms.9  It is now well established that profit-maximizing 
prices must solve a coordination problem between the multiple sides.  A 
group of users will usually place no value on a platform unless one or more 
of the other groups of users are also on the platform.  Moreover there have 
to be enough users on the other side to generate value.  The pricing 
structure—the relative prices that each group of users pays—is important 
for solving this coordination problem.  The profit-maximizing prices may 
be at or below marginal cost, and may be zero or negative, and therefore 
reflect a type of subsidy to one side.  (The social welfare maximizing prices 
have the same characteristics although there is no guarantee that the 
privately and socially optimal prices will coincide.10) 
In practice, multi-sided platforms use a wide variety of mechanisms 
to generate value for platform users and to structure how much net value 
each group of users receives.11  Platforms simultaneously determine how to 
maximize the overall value of the platform for the users and the allocation 
of this value among both user groups and the platform owner.  Slicing the 
pie differently results in bigger or smaller pies because of the 
interdependencies between the groups.  The platform owner therefore needs 
to figure out how to slice the pie in order to make the pie as big as possible. 
The governance of negative externalities is part of this larger set of 
mechanisms for maximizing and allocating value. 
 
A.  The Platform Toolkit 
  
Multi-sided platform businesses have a number of ways to solve 
coordination problems and generate value for users. 
Once an entrepreneur has identified a coordination problem that can 
be solved with a multi-sided platform, she needs to develop a design and a 
set of products and services that will solve that problem.  There is much 
work between recognizing latent demand for video sharing and the creation 
of a platform to meet that need.  YouTube had to design a software and 
                                                
9 See E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 AMER. ECON. REV. 1642 
(2010). 
10 The privately optimal prices set by a multi-sided platform may differ from the socially optimal 
prices if the platform sets prices too high and output too low. But it may also select a pricing structure 
that does not solve the coordination problem between the groups of users as efficiently as a social 
planner would.  See Alexander White & E. Glen Weyl, Insulated Platform Competition, NET 
Institute Working Paper No. 10-17 (2011). 
11 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind the 
World’s Most Dynamic Companies (HBS 2007); Thomas Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker & Marshall 
W. Van Alstyne, Strategies for Two-Sided Markets, HARV.BUS. REV. 92 (Oct. 2006); Kevin J. 
Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, op. cit. 
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hardware platform that enabled people to upload and view videos.  That 
design included features that helped people who uploaded videos to find an 
audience and helped people who wanted to view videos to find ones they 
would enjoy.  The term “platform design” refers to aspects of the platform 
that facilitate the interaction of the different types of users. 
Platforms also provide specific packages of products or services to 
each type of user.  As with a single-sided business, the platform has to 
decide on the optimal combination of product attributes and price. The 
difference in the case of a multi-sided platform is that offerings that induce 
users on one side to join the platform and interact often provide value to the 
users on the other side.  Operating system designers frequently provide 
software developers with software developer kits (SDKs) and other 
assistance to facilitate the efficient development of software that works on 
the platform.  End users benefit from those quality enhancements indirectly. 
Platforms may charge users fees for access and/or use.  They can in 
some cases adjust these prices to achieve an optimal combination of users 
given their demands.  That may entail having a higher incremental profit 
margin from one side than the other. It also may lead to implicit subsidies to 
some or all users on one side.  OpenTable, for example, charges restaurants 
for participating in its platform and a fee for each reservation made through 
the platform; people can make reservations and access other additional 
services such as reviews, directions, and restaurant suggestions for free.12 
Finally, and a central subject of this article, platforms can develop 
and employ governance systems that regulate the actions of participants.  
These systems can employ implicit or explicit contracts, detection 
mechanisms, and penalties.   
 
B.  Value Creation and Externalities 
  
These tools are important for achieving the fundamental economic 
purpose of a platform: to release value by bringing users together. eBay did 
this by creating a website where sellers could post products for sale, 
developing an auction mechanism that allowed buyers to bid for those 
products, providing a convenient payment mechanism that enabled sellers 
to receive funds from buyers, a rating system that enabled buyers to 
communicate information about the sellers they dealt with to other buyers, 
and rules to ensure the integrity of the bidding and selling process. One 
study of eBay found that the buyers obtained consumer surplus that 
                                                
12 See Farhad Manjoo, As OpenTable Booms, Who Gets the Dough? Fast Company (April 20, 
2011), online at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/155/as-opentable-booms-who-gets-the-
dough.html (last visited August 23, 2011).  
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averaged about $4 per purchase and totaled more than $7 billion in 2003.13  
The sellers earned surplus as well, equal to the difference between what 
they netted from buyers and their personal valuations of the goods.   
Platforms rely on the tools described above to maximize the value 
they create for users overall subject to various constraints including costs.  
A core challenge is enabling users that can engage in mutually beneficial 
exchanges to find each other.  That is partly addressed through platform 
design. Online dating sites such as eHarmony rely on detailed 
questionnaires and learning from psychology to find matches for people and 
then have a process for people to narrow their searches.  
The platform also needs to ensure that there are “high-quality” 
matches in which the users can split significant value.  For many multi-
sided platforms, the likelihood of high-quality matches increases with the 
number of participants.  To develop thicker markets, platforms use pricing 
and other tools to drive participation and positive feedback effects.  Some 
stock exchanges, for example, provide subsidies to providers of liquidity.14  
More liquidity providers attract more liquidity takers that, in turn, drive 
more liquidity providers. 
 
C.  Value Distribution and Coordination 
 
   
As these examples illustrate, value creation is intimately connected 
to value distribution.  A platform has to secure the participation of each side 
in sufficient numbers to generate value. That involves solving a 
coordination problem.  Members of each group of users would benefit from 
being on the platform but they will not join the platform unless enough 
members of the other groups join as well. 
The economic literature on two-sided markets demonstrates the role 
of the pricing structure in solving this coordination problem.  By tilting the 
pricing structure so that one side contributes relatively more incremental 
margin and the other side contributes relatively less incremental margin, the 
platform can potentially entice enough members of each group to join. Once 
they do, positive feedback effects can fuel growth. 
These economic models focus, for simplicity, on the prices that 
agents are charged. More generally, however, platforms provide net value to 
members of each group where that net value is the difference between the 
total value received and the total cost incurred by that member. Platforms 
                                                
13 See Ravi Bapna, Wolfgang Jank & Galit Shmueli, Consumer Surplus in Online Auctions, 19 
INFO. SYS. RES. 400, 400 (2008). 
14 See NYSE Euronext, 2010 Annual Report - Form 10-K (Feb. 28, 2011) 22. 
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solve the coordination problem through adjusting what users receive15 as 
well as how much they pay.  Apple provides many features on its phones 
that users find attractive. It also provides software developers with an 
operating system, tools, and a store for selling applications that they find 
appealing. 
In deciding the relative benefits realized by each group of agents the 
platform necessarily makes decisions that allocate benefits between 
different groups of users. All else equal, charging one group less means 
charging another group more.  The point extends beyond pricing.  Platforms 
make design and other decisions that shift the relative benefits between the 
two sides.  Shopping malls, for example, often place anchor stores that 
attract the most shoppers as far apart as possible, put up and down 
escalators far apart, and make other physical design decisions to increase 
the foot traffic in front of stores.  They therefore convey an added benefit on 
the stores, who pay for space at the mall, while imposing some costs on 
shoppers who get in for free.16    
 
 
II. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND PLATFORM COMMUNITIES 
 
Platforms create communities of users with shared interests who 
benefit from being together. Successful platforms have identified positive 
interdependencies between users, figured out how to reduce transactions 
costs between these users, and determined price and non-price mechanisms 
for bringing these users together, thereby coordinating them into a 
community. Google, for example, has created a community around its 
Android operating system consisting of consumers, software developers, 
hardware manufacturers, and mobile carriers.17 
In many situations in which users have formed a community, they 
can harm as well as benefit each other. Members of a polity can cause fires, 
inflict bodily harm, pollute, make the neighborhood look bad, commit 
fraud, cause congestion, and engage in many other kinds of behavior that 
                                                
15 That is, the platform may decide to shift the demand schedule for a group of users to the right 
or the left by providing more or fewer product attributes that these users value.  
16 For a general analysis of strategies in which platforms increase consumer search costs see 
Andrei Hagiu & Bruno Jullien, Why do Intermediaries Divert Search?, 42 RAND. J. ECON 337 (2011). 
17 See Wilson Rothman, Analysis: Google’s Android Phone and the Four Carriers, Gizmodo 
(Nov 5, 2007), online at http://gizmodo.com/319127/analysis-googles-android-phone-and-the-four-
carriers (last visited Aug. 1, 2011); Adam Dachis, Google and Hardware Manufacturers Promise 
Android Software Upgrades For 18 Months, Lifehacker (May 10, 2011), online at 
http://lifehacker.com/5800425/google-and-hardware-manufacturers-promise-android-software-
upgrades-every-18-months  (last visited Aug 1, 2011); Erik Sherman, Amazon Teaches App 
Developers to Smarten Up the Hard Way, BNet (Aug. 4, 2011), online at 
http://www.bnet.com/blog/technology-business/amazon-teaches-app-developers-to-smarten-up-the-
hard-way/12146 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
10 Bad Behavior on Multi-Sided Platforms [26-August 2011]  
hurt other members of the community. People benefit from joining clubs to 
share costs and companionship. But members can also impose costs on each 
other from, for example, being unpleasant or unkempt. Other entities also 
face negative externalities.  For a highway system, drivers can cause 
congestion, cause harm by driving carelessly and emit noxious gases.  
Fisheries have the well-known problem of over fishing. In all these cases 
the members collectively would like the community—the polity, club, or 
entity—to be governed in a manner that discourages negative externalities. 
Communities usually adopt mechanisms to do so.  
Although the purpose of a multi-sided platform is to generate 
positive externalities some of the users may impose negative externalities in 
many of the same ways and for many of the same reasons as other 
communities. This section examines the sources of negative externalities 
and the next considers governance systems for dealing with them.  
 
A.   Fraud, Misrepresentation, and other Opportunistic Behavior 
 
All varieties of opportunistic behavior occur on platforms.  There is 
fraud. Merchants, for example, sell counterfeit goods18 or take payment but 
then do not ship the goods.19 There is misrepresentation.  People lie about 
their age or their weight on dating sites,20 what their applications will do on 
a smartphone,21 or how popular their websites are.22  This list does not 
exhaust the ways in which opportunistic behavior can occur on platforms.  
For example, firms can encourage their employees to click on a 
competitor’s ads on search engines to impose costs on them.23  
 
                                                
18See Rob Unsworth, Amazon Marketplace Offering Dangerous Goods, BBC (Dec. 8, 2008), 
online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/watchdog/2008/12/amazon_marketplace_offering_da.html (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
19 See Amazon Marketplace and Ebay Fraud, Andre Gunther Photography, online at 
http://www.aguntherphotography.com/blog/amazon-marketplace-ebay-fraud.html (last visited August 
23, 2011). 
20 See  Illusion or Deception? Why do some people misrepresent themselves on dating sites?, eH 
Advice, online at http://advice.eharmony.com/boards/dating-advice/dating/50844-illusion-deception-
why-do-some-people-misrepresent-themselves-dating-sites-3.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
21 See Claudine Beaumont, Google remotely deletes Android apps, The Telegraph (Jun. 25, 
2010, 4:31 PM), online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7854560/Google-remotely-
deletes-Android-apps.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
22 See Tom Espiner, Google blacklists BMW.de, Cnet News (Feb. 6, 2006), online at 
http://news.cnet.com/Google-blacklists-BMW.de/2100-1024_3-6035412.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2011). 
23See Dan Shipe, Is AdWords Click Manipulation Taking Money From your Pocket?, 
Articles/Net (Aug. 29, 2008), online at http://www.articleslash.net/Internet-and-Businesses-
Online/PPC-Advertising/475634__Is-AdWords-Click-Manipulation-Taking-Money-From-Your-
Pocket.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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B.  Poor and Asymmetric Information 
 
A standard problem in the exchange of value is that one party has 
information that the other party does not have.  The failure to disclose 
information imposes costs on actual and potential trading partners. In the 
extreme this can lead to market breakdowns as a result of the lemons 
problem.24  The collapse of the videogame market in the United States in 
1983 is often attributed to a proliferation of low quality games driving out 
good quality games.25 More generally it reduces market efficiency by 
reducing the likelihood that users will find the matches that maximize the 
total value from trade. Several studies have found that requiring corporate 
bond traders to disclose information on trading prices resulted in improved 
efficiency and substantially lower trading costs.26 Opportunistic behavior 
resulting from asymmetric information may increase the uncertainty for 
people and companies that are considering using a platform.  Traders may 
prefer platforms that have transparent pricing and social network users may 
prefer platforms where information about people is reliable.    
 Asymmetric information does not necessarily result in negative 
externalities for a platform overall.   Users may need to have incentives to 
invest in acquiring information, and being able to capitalize on their control 
over that information may provide those incentives. The benefits from 
increased dynamic efficiency from investment in gathering information may 
outweigh the losses from lower static efficiency as a result of not sharing 
that information.27  Greater transparency on social networks has its costs 
too. Information that increases the value of one relationship may decrease 
the value of another relationship.28   
                                                
24 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
25 See David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu & Richard Schmalensee, Invisible Engines: How Software 
Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, 125 (2006). 
26 These studies concern the introduction of the TRACE system for corporate bonds in the 
United States. See Hendrik Bessembinder, William Maxwell, and Kumar Venkataraman, Market 
Transparency, Liquidity Externalities, and Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds, 82 J. 
FINAN. ECON. 251 (2006); Amy Edwards, Lawrence Harris & Michael Piwowar, Corporate Bond 
Market Transparency and Transaction Costs, 62 J. FINANCE 1421 (June 2007); Michael Goldstein, 
Edith Hotchkiss & Erik Sirri, Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate 
Bonds, 2 REV. FINAN. STUD. 235 (2007). For a summary, see William F. Maxwell & Hendrik 
Bessembinder, Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 217 (Spring 
2008). 
27 Studies of increased transparency in bond markets found that it may have reduced liquidity 
leading to some markets being inefficiently thin. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, 
Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 217, 228 (2008). 
28 See Danah Boyd, None of this is Real in Joe Karaganis, ed., Structures of Participation in 
Digital Culture 132, 145 (SSRC 2007). For the record, Ms. Boyd does not capitalize her first or last 
name. This imposes a negative externality on people, like me, who then have to deal with editors and 
readers who are not in on the deviation from grammatical rules. 
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C.  Congestion and Optimizing Physical Spaces 
 
Negative externalities can result from increasing the number of users 
for multi-sided platforms.  Physical platforms face congestion problems.  A 
nightclub provides a trivial example. Too many people will make it harder 
for people to mingle and enjoy themselves. A shopping mall provides a 
more interesting example.  An increase in the number of merchants may 
increase search costs and therefore harm other sellers as well as buyers.   
Multi-sided platforms have to design and manage their spaces to 
reduce negative externalities as well as to promote positive externalities.  
Expanding the footprint of a mall to accommodate more stores imposes 
costs on shoppers who have to walk farther on average. Similar 
considerations apply to virtual platforms.  Search engines need to make 
decisions on how many results and advertisements to display on a page and 
in what format. They need to do this to promote positive externalities and 
also to limit congestion and reduce search costs. 
 
 
D.  Personal Harm 
 
Polities have rules to prevent people from assaulting other people, 
engaging in bodily harm, libel, and causing mental distress.  These issues 
can arise on multi-sided platforms as well.  Interactions on nightclubs and 
other physical and virtual dating venues can result in bodily harm.  Social 
networks can be used for engaging in libel and can cause mental distress. A 
highly publicized case involved the use of a social network by a Lori Drew 
to retaliate against a girl, Megan Meier, who had a disagreement with her 
daughter.  Using a fake account Drew orchestrated an online romance with 
Meier, had the fake boy become hostile, and eventually had the fake boy 
suggest that Meier kill herself, which she did.29 
 
E.  Offensive Behavior 
 
Interactions on multi-sided platforms can involve behavior that 
some users find offensive.  This is no different than a regular community.  
People may incur costs as a result of unwanted exposure to hate speech, 
pornography, videos of violence, and other offensive content.  Even if they 
are not exposed to this content they may dislike being part of a community 
                                                
29 See Associated Press, Mom: MySpace Hoax Led to Daughter’s Suicide, Fox News (Nov. 16, 
2007), online at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,312018,00.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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in which it takes place. 
 
F.  Opportunistic Behavior 
 
Platform users can engage in various kinds of opportunistic behavior 
that do not fall neatly into one of the categories above.  Brokers on 
exchange platforms could engage in front running—that is profiting from 
information on trades placed by clients possibly to the detriment of the 
client. That creates an agency problem in addition to an asymmetric 
information issue.  Merchants may impose surcharges on people that pay 
with a payment card as a result of using the desire to pay with a card as a 
sorting device in a price discrimination scheme.  Such behavior could 
impose negative externalities on the payment card product by increasing 
uncertainty about its costs. 
 
G.  DecorMyEyes 
 
Vitaly Borker’s strategies for selling eyewear on the web highlights 
almost all these forms of bad behavior although it also provides a lesson in 
what happens when platform governance is imperfect.  Mr. Borker learned 
that search engines did not distinguish between good and bad cites to his 
website.  He responded to complaints with highly offensive emails that 
generated even more complaints.  He told a New York Times reporter,“I’ve 
exploited this opportunity because it works.  No matter where they post 
their negative comments, it helps my return on investment.  So I decided, 
why not use that negativity to my advantage?”30 
Mr. Borker, who used the aliases Tony Russo and Stanley Bolds, 
received many complaints because he engaged in fraudulent behavior 
including adding spurious charges to customers’ payment cards.  When 
people pursued their complaints against him, Mr. Borker—sometimes using 
one of his aliases—threatened them with bodily harm including death or 
rape.  He threatened one woman who was overcharged with sexual violence 
when she said she was going to have her credit card issuer reverse the 
charge.  She was later sent pictures of the outside of her apartment building 
in a further attempt to intimidate her. 
Mr. Borker relied heavily on two web platforms for these practices.  
He fulfilled his orders from sellers on eBay who were directed to ship to his 
customers.  He also used search engine rankings to drive business.  Initially, 
at least, the governance systems of these platforms failed to thwart him.  In 
                                                
30 David Segal, A Bully Finds a Pulpit on the Web, The New York Times (November 26, 2010), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/business/28borker.html (last visited on August 22, 
2011). 
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the case of search he had discovered a way to game the search algorithm as 
well as the detection methods then in place for identifying efforts to distort 
results.  After the story was reported, Google developed an algorithm to 
detect efforts to increase search rankings by encouraging bad comments.31  
Meanwhile, public law took care of Mr. Borker who pled guilty to wire 
fraud, mail fraud, and sending threatening communications.32 
 
III. DEALING WITH BAD BEHAVIOR 
 
Multi-sided businesses could simply rely on civil and criminal law 
and government regulation to deal with the negative externalities that arise 
on their platforms.33  Users have recourse to laws involving breach of 
contract, fraud, market manipulation, assault and battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress to deal with many of the problems discussed 
above.  Laws and regulations have tackled asymmetric information 
problems through mandatory disclosure rules, cooling off periods, and 
return policies.  New multi-sided platform businesses can give rise to novel 
issues such as cyber bullying.  Governments can pass new laws in response 
to this as the State of Missouri did after the Megan Meier suicide and the 
unsuccessful prosecution of the instigator.34 
Some multi-sided platforms, have, however developed their own 
mechanisms for dealing with bad behavior. They adopt rules for the users 
on one or more sides of the platform, have reporting and detection 
mechanisms to uncovering violations of these rules, evaluations of the 
evidence including mandatory arbitrations, penalties, and sometimes even 
have appeals from the initial evaluation. 
There are two reasons for platforms not relying entirely on the 
public sector. 
The first is that the platforms generally are able to enforce rules to 
reduce negative externalities more rapidly and efficiently than the public 
                                                
31 Alyson Shontell, Making Customers Hate You Makes Google Love You, Business Insider 
(December 3, 2010), online at http://www.businessinsider.com/making-customers-hate-you-makes-
google-love-you-2010-12 (last visited on August 22, 2011). 
32 Kathy Kristof, Online Retailer Guilty of Fraud, Threats, CBS Moneywatch.com (December 6, 
2010), online at http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/blog/devil-details/online-retailer-
charged-with-fraud-threats/3478/ (last visited on August 22, 2011). 
33 According to the Coase Theorem, of course, absent market failures such as imperfect 
information, the agents could deal with these problems efficiently through private contracting.  The 
emergence of the platform itself, however, indicates that information is imperfect, or there is some 
other transaction cost, and the Coase Theorem does not hold. See Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean 
Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Market, 1 J. EUROP. ECON. ASS’N. 990 (2003). 
34 See Associated Press, Mo. Internet Harassment Bill Passed After MySpace Suicide, USA 
Today (Jul. 1, 2008, 1:16 PM), online at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-06-30-
internet_N.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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sector can.35  Search engines can develop algorithms for detecting efforts to 
manipulate search rankings and delist websites that are trying to take 
advantage of users or demote them in the search rankings. An e-commerce 
platform can decide after a few complaints to drop a merchant from its site 
and exchanges can debar traders. In addition to the inherent differences in 
the efficiency of public and private actors, the fact that the public sector 
must give people and businesses rights of due process (which society has 
found necessary to check the government’s enormous powers over its 
citizens) necessarily makes the enforcement of laws and regulations by the 
public sector more time consuming and expensive. A platform owner, for 
example, can monitor a user’s behavior without showing probable cause, as 
would the government exercising its police powers. A platform can 
therefore provide value to its community by providing an efficient 
governance system. 
The second reason for a platform to take action is that public laws 
and regulations may be incomplete when it comes to policing negative 
externalities on platforms. The government may not have recognized a 
problem such as cyber bullying on social networks or the opportunistic 
inflation of search rankings.  It may have other objectives or obligations 
such as the protection of free speech that deter or preclude it from enforcing 
rules that private parties may decide to adopt themselves—such as against 
hate speech or pornography.  The government may also decide not to pursue 
various problems simply because the cost of doing so—including 
unintended consequences that often result from government laws and 
regulations—exceeds the likely benefits. The platform has more 
information about the problems, can react more quickly to them, and can 
modify its governance mechanisms more quickly if they are not working or 
are having perverse effects. 
 A private platform does not, of course, have the same range of 
instruments available to it as a public entity does. It cannot issue search 
warrants, engage in wiretaps, conduct dawn raids, put people in jail, or 
debar wrongdoers from anything other than participating on the platform 
itself. Unless it invokes public laws, for example by filing a breach of 
contract case, it cannot compel the discovery of information for an 
investigation. Nor can a private platform collect penalties unless it has 
required a bond or collects them as a condition of the agent having 
continued access to the platform. 
In fact, all of the platform’s powers, aside from contract and other 
rights that it would have to enforce in public courts, rest in its property 
                                                
35 For a related discussion see Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U L. REV. 
1719 (2004); Henry Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.1 
(2004). 
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rights over the platform including, most importantly, its ability to exclude. 
This section elaborates on this point before turning to an overview of 
platform governance concerning negative externalities.   
 
A.  Platform Governance and Exclusion 
 
Strahilovetz has presented a useful framework for analyzing how 
property rights can be used to deal with information asymmetries.36 The 
right to exclude has four subordinate rights: (1) the Hermit’s right to keep 
all agents off the owner’s property; (2) the Bouncer’s right to admit agents 
selectively to the property and therefore to eject agents selectively from the 
property; (3) the Exclusionary Vibe which uses social and psychological 
sanctions to discourage some agents from entering the property; and (4) the 
Exclusionary Amenity which uses club goods to sort desirable and 
undesirable entrants.  He argues that the last three of these rights are 
substitutable methods for maximizing the value of the property. 
 Strahilovetz’s framework generally maps well into the tools that 
multi-sided platforms use to optimize the value of their property.  Some 
multi-sided platforms start out life single-sided.  For example, the Palm 
Pilot created their own applications and did not allow others to do so for 
about 18 months after their launch. They exercised Hermit Rights through 
design decisions.37  Almost all of the strategies for reducing negative 
externalities depend on the exercise of the Bouncer’s Right. This is 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  The Exclusionary Vibe and 
Exclusionary Amenity are used by many platforms to attract a particular 
group of users on one side that is valuable to a particular group of users on 
the other side. There is a blurry line between the two strategies for multi-
sided platforms. Niche magazines are an example.  Runners World is 
designed to attract runners and companies that want to sell to them.  The 
vibe and amenity go together—companies that want to advertise to runners 
are attracted to the amenity by an aggregation of runners created by the vibe 
generated by the content (not to mention the title). 
Smith, who Strahilovetz builds on, argues that property rights and 
governance are substitutes from the standpoint of maximizing social 
welfare.38  The idea is that there are some market failures that governments 
                                                
36 See Lior Jacob Strahilovetz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1838, ___ (August 2006). Boudreau and Hagiu, id., emphasize the “bouncer’s right” 
identified by Strahilovetz. However, in the context of their analysis of the general solution by 
platforms of market failures platforms also use the exclusionary vibe (e.g. a magazine for a niche 
audience) and the exclusionary amenity (an discount department store as an anchor in a mall).     
37 See David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu & Richard Schmalensee, Invisible Engines: How Software 
Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, 169 (MIT 2006).  
38 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002). 
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can resolve precisely through laws and regulation. There are others that 
private parties can solve through the blunt instrument of property rights 
because they have better access to information. 
 Multi-sided platforms can be analyzed in this framework.  They 
represent the interests of a community—albeit a private and voluntary 
ones—just as a government does, and are perhaps even more motivated 
than the government to maximize, at least approximately, the social wealth 
of that community. The platform owner also has incentives to take the long-
run interests of the community into account since it is maximizing the long-
run value for itself or its shareholders. The platform often uses, among other 
things, a governance system for dealing with negative externalities among 
platform users.  But for the platform, property rights—and the bundle of 
rights to exclude identified by Strahilovetz, and in particular the Bouncer’s 
Right—are necessary for governance. 
 
B.  Governance and Property Rights 
 
Platform governance generally consists of a set of rules for platform 
agents that proscribe certain actions by these agents or compel certain other 
actions.  These rules can be used to increase positive externalities. For 
example, card networks require banks to insert acceptance marks on cards 
and merchants to post acceptance marks; this makes it easier for cardholders 
and merchants who use the same payment method to find each other.  More 
commonly, though, rules are designed to eliminate or mitigate negative 
externalities.  These rules need to have consequences to be meaningful.  
Those consequences generally involve partial or full exclusion from the 
platform, or its benefits, for some period of time, including forever.  The 
platform also needs to be able to detect violations for these rules to be 
meaningful. That could be a combination of proactive detection or response 
to complaints.  And finally, the platform may employ a process in which 
suspected wrongdoers can plead their cases, or at least convey potentially 
useful information, and possibly an appeals process. 
The Portobello Road Antique Dealers Association in London 
provides an example.39  A number of antique dealers have located on 
Portobello Road in London. That is a common situation in the economic 
geography of agglomeration and is an example of a platform that emerges 
naturally without any necessary ownership.  But some of these dealers 
decided to start an association to address common issues.  One of those 
issues involved creating and maintaining a high quality brand. For this 
purpose they adopted a code of ethics. Members are required to post the 
                                                
39 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Catalyst Code: The Strategies Behind the 
World’s Most Dynamic Companies 110-111 (HBS 2007). 
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price and as much information as possible about the item. The code also 
prohibits members from misrepresenting antiques or misleading their 
customers.  The association also provides a dispute resolution service for 
customers who believe they have gotten a bad deal.  Members who violate 
the code can be bounced from the association and the therefore lose access 
to the signal that it provides to customers. 
Other commerce platforms have similar rules. eBay has a detailed 
user agreement for buyers and sellers.40 It tells users that eBay has the right 
to restrict their access to the site in various ways, including full termination, 
if the user abuses the site.41 The user agreement includes a mandatory 
dispute resolution mechanism for buyers and sellers. eBay has detailed rules 
for buyers42 and sellers43 that prohibit a variety of actions that could result 
in negative externalities. A major concern is the integrity of the auction 
process. For example, buyers are not allowed to bid on items offered by 
sellers they know personally.  Sellers who are banned from the site can 
appeal that decision.44 
These types of rules solve several possible externality problems.  
Card users likely value certainty over the prices they will pay when they use 
their cards at accepting merchants; they also likely value the certainty that 
merchants that advertise through signage that they accept the network’s card 
actually do so.  To the extent that merchants impose surcharges or refuse 
cards they impose costs not only on the cardholders affected by these 
decisions but also cardholders generally through the introduction of 
uncertainty.  In addition, merchants that surcharge cards or refuse to accept 
cards selectively may impose costs on other merchants by degrading the 
overall quality of this form of payment.  There is a further negative 
externality. Some merchants may use the desire to pay with a card as a 
                                                
40 See Ebay, Your User Agreement, online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
41 The user agreement, id., says “Without limiting other remedies, we may limit, suspend or 
terminate our service and user accounts, prohibit access to our sites and their content, services and 
tools, delay or remove hosted content, and take technical and legal steps to keep users off the sites if 
we think that they are creating problems or possible legal liabilities, infringing the intellectual 
property rights of third parties, or acting inconsistently with the letter or spirit of our policies (for 
example, and without limitation, policies related to shill bidding, conducting off-eBay transactions, 
feedback manipulation, circumventing temporary or permanent suspensions or users who we believe 
are harassing our employees or other users).  Additionally, we may, in appropriate circumstances and 
at our discretion, suspend or terminate accounts of users who may be repeat infringers of intellectual 
property rights of third parties. We also reserve the right to cancel unconfirmed accounts or accounts 
that have been inactive for a long time, or to modify or discontinue eBay sites, services or tools.”   
42 See Ebay, Your User Agreement, online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/buyer-rules-
overview.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
43 See Ebay, Rules For Sellers – Overview, online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/seller-
rules-overview.html (visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
44 See Ebay, Rules For Sellers – Overview, online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/seller-
rules-overview.html (visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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method for implementing price discrimination. On average consumers that 
want to pay with cards are less likely to have another equally convenient 
payment method and may therefore be willing to pay a higher price to the 
merchant. This may be a profit maximizing strategy especially for when it is 
unlikely the consumer would be a repeat customer (e.g. a tourist). 
  A common problem for dating sites involves preventing unwanted 
approaches. Sites such as eHarmony check their users against lists of 
registered sex offenders. They also do not allow users to search for profiles. 
Instead the site matches profiles using its algorithm. An introduction is 
made only if both parties agree to this. At that point, individual identifying 
information is made available to both parties.  eHarmony also provides a 
service whereby users can report problems and eHarmony can take actions 
including removing offending individuals from its service.45	  
While many multi-sided platforms have governance systems to limit 
negative externalities, others do not or have quite limited ones.  In the next 
section we will see how MySpace, the leading social network site in the 
United States in the mid 2000s, had a very limited governance system 
initially and imposed some rules only in response to significant media and 
governmental pressure.  Advertising supported media tend to have very 
limited screening of ads. They often prohibit advertisements that would be 
offensive to their readers.  The Chicago Tribune does not intentionally take 
advertisements for sex services although Craigslist does.  But they do not 
police false advertising or provide readers with any mechanism for 
complaining about advertisers they have interacted with as a result of seeing 
an advertisement in the media.	  
The rules discussed above are generally enforced using the 
Bouncer’s Right.  Users that violate the rules can be ejected from the 
platform.  Some people—such as known sexual predators on dating sites—
are barred from getting on the platform in the first place.  
 
C.  Governance and Information Provision 
  
Multi-sided platforms also provide information to deal with negative 
externalities.  That has become increasingly common as a result of the 
development of Internet and web technologies.  eBay Motors has reduced 
                                                
45 Pam Holmgren, A Safety Reminder from eHarmony, eHarmony Blog (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://advice.eharmony.com/blog/2011/04/18/a-safety-reminder-from-eharmony-2/ (last visited 
August 1, 2011). “If you ever are concerned about one of your matches for any reason, please send an 
email to matchconcerns@eharmony.com so we can investigate and take appropriate action. We have 
a team dedicated to our members’ safety and close accounts immediately when we receive a credible 
complaint about someone’s suspicious behavior. We’ll notify you whenever someone is removed 
from the service, so please pay attention to those emails if you ever receive one and stop all 
communication with that person.” 
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the lemons problem by providing ratings on automobile dealers.  eBay 
provides a mechanism for consumers to rate merchants after they have 
made a purchase.  They send consumers reminders to provide these ratings.  
A consumer can minimize the likelihood of getting a car with undisclosed 
problems by buying from an automobile dealer that has a very high rating.  
Automobile dealers presumably know that a negative rating can have a 
serious effect on their ability to make sales. The reviews limit the ability of 
automobile dealers to take advantage of consumers by exploiting 
asymmetric information. They also limit the ability of dealers to impose 
negative externalities on each other since bad dealers tend to drive out good 
dealers as consumers lower their expectations on the quality of cars they 
get.  Similar rating systems are common now on web-based platforms that 
connect buyers and sellers. 
The provision of information is often an application of the 
Exclusionary Vibe.  The multi-sided platform is exercising its property 
rights when it collects information from users on the platform about other 
users and makes it available. It does not bounce users that engage in 
opportunistic behavior, or users that create negative externalities as a result 
of the lemons problem, but it does establish a mechanism that tends to drive 
low quality users off of the platform. 
The Exclusionary Vibe can be used to reduce negative externalities 
in other ways than the direct provision of information.  An example is JDate 
which advertises itself as the premier Jewish singles community.46  One 
would expect that having Gentiles would impose negative externalities on 
Jews looking for other Jews since it would increase their search costs and 
reduce matching inefficiency. It would not appear that the site has any way 
to judge religious or ethnic background, so it could not specifically exclude 
non-Jews. But it can set off a vibe that this is a site meant for Jewish men 
and women to meet each other.  It also at least asks Gentiles to identify 
themselves. 
  
 
 IV. GOVERNANCE REGIMES FOR KEY PLATFORMS 
 
Four economically prominent platform types illustrate the role of 
governance systems, the methods that are chosen for these governance 
systems, and the tensions that governance systems create between the 
platform sides.  
A.  Social Networks 
 
The evolution of social networks from Friendster to MySpace to 
                                                
46 See JDate, online at http://www.jdate.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).   
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Facebook shows the role of negative externalities in platforms that are 
perhaps the closest to traditional communities and how different treatments 
of the negative externalities can affect platform value. 
Friendster launched in 2002 and grew rapidly.47 Jonathan Abrans, its 
founder, thought the dating sites of the time were “too anonymous and 
creepy.”48  They also provided inaccurate information. As he put it, “With 
JDate, a guy is almost bound to be twenty pounds heavier or twenty years 
older than he is in his photo….”  To solve this problem Abrams developed 
Friendster so that people could link to friends and see their friends. “We’re 
trying to make the process more accountable,” he said. “People will put a 
more accurate picture of themselves on Friendster because you know your 
friends will see it.”49  By 2003 Friendster had more than 3 million users.50 
The use of Friendster to create fake profiles became quickly popular.  
The “Fakesters” as they were called made up personas for themselves. 
According to Danah Boyd, “Fakesters were created for famous people, 
fictional characters, objects, places and locations, identity markers, 
concepts, animals, and communities.”51 
 Friendster’s management decided that Fakesters were not 
compatible with the “vibe” they wanted for the social networking site.  
According to Boyd, “Although most participants loved the playful aspect of 
Fakesters, it further complicated the network structure and created an 
appearance of unreliability, which irritated both the company and 
individuals intent on using Friendster for serious networking.”52  In 
addition, some of the Fakesters attracted massive traffic, which caused 
congestion on the site’s servers. Friendster’s owners decided to purge the 
Fakesters who consumed significant amounts of scarce server capacity in 
addition to creating noise. 
The Fakesters organized themselves, however, and attempted to 
reinsert their profiles.  They also sought revenge on Friendster by having 
“Fraudsters” masquerade as real people.  Friendster’s growth slowed 
considerably as a result of its efforts to exclude people from the network. 
                                                
47 See Danah Boyd, None of this is Real in Joe Karaganis, eds, Structures of Participation in 
Digital Culture 132, 133 (SSRC 2007). 
48 See Finding Love Online, Version 2.0, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jun. 10, 2003), online at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2003/tc20030610_4294_PG2_tc104.htm (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
49 See Julia Angwin, Stealing MySpace: The Battle to Control the Most Popular Website in 
America, 50 (Random House 2009).  
50 See A Cautionary Tale, Fast Company (May 1, 2007), online at 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/115/open_features-hacker-dropout-ceo-cautionary-tale.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
51 See Danah Boyd, None of this is Real in Joe Karaganis, eds, Structures of Participation in 
Digital Culture 132, 148 (SSRC 2007). 
52 See Danah Boyd, None of this is Real in Joe Karaganis, eds, Structures of Participation in 
Digital Culture 132, 150 (SSRC 2007).  
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 MySpace opened in late 2003.  Its founders thought that Friendster 
was making a mistake in preventing people from having fake identities.  It 
quickly attracted people who were being deleted from Friendster. One was 
Tila Tequila, a Vietnamese model, whose real surname was Nguyen and 
who attracted a larger following on Friendster in part by posting 
provocative photos of herself. Friendster deleted her account several times. 
She moved to the welcoming MySpace.  Others followed. MySpace grew 
very quickly, overtook Friendster, and became one of the most heavily 
trafficked sites on the Internet for a period of time.53 
 MySpace’s laissez faire policy soon caused problems.  With no 
restrictions or even a vibe that encouraged people to provide reliable 
information MySpace attracted child sex predators as well as minors who 
lied about their ages.  The site also did little to discourage people from 
having user pages with “partial nudity, obscenity, crude sexual jokes, and 
other objectionable content.”54  MySpace gained a reputation as a “vortex of 
perversion”55 and as a site that was not very safe—like a city’s red light 
district. 
Of course, as the popularity of the site attests, a large number of 
people liked the risqué nature of MySpace. One important part of the 
platform community did not.  The principal source of revenue for MySpace 
came from advertisers. But companies did not want to risk having their 
brands displayed on pages with objectionable content.  With limited interest 
from major brands in buying advertising inventory, MySpace moved its 
advertising inventory to other advertising networks, including Google’s 
context-based advertising network. These networks inserted low-price ads 
automatically into space MySpace made available. Not surprisingly—given 
the content of the site, the low prices for the advertising inventory, and 
some of the people attracted to MySpace—a number of the ads that were 
displayed were also related to things that some people would find 
objectionable.  
 Facebook, which started in February 2004, took a different 
approach. Like Friendster it focused on creating a platform for people to 
manage their relationships with friends.  But it required people to use their 
real identities. It initially limited access to the site to people with valid 
university email accounts ending in “.edu,” starting with harvard.edu. It 
                                                
53 It was one of comScore’s top fifty web properties in the US by April 2005. See Julia Angwin, 
Stealing MySpace: The Battle to Control the Most Popular Website in America 126 (Random House 
2009). 
54 See Julia Angwin, Stealing MySpace: The Battle to Control the Most Popular Website in 
America, 181 (Random House 2009).  
55 See Felix Gillette, The Rise and Inglorious Fall of MySpace, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jun. 
22, 2011, 11:01 PM), online at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/b4235053917570_page_5.htm (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2011). 
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then expanded to selected groups including businesses with identifiable 
email addresses.  When it opened to the world in September 2006 people it 
had 500 regional networks of people.  Although this approach made it more 
difficult for people to use fake identities on Facebook it was still possible.  
Facebook, like Friendster, deletes the pages with fake identities that violate 
its terms of service.  For example, in 2007 it deleted the pages that people 
had set up to represent brands that were not allowed at the time.56 
 Facebook has taken active steps to limit negative externalities on its 
site that would limit its appeal to people and to advertisers who are 
considering inserting messages on its pages. Its terms of service prohibit 
various actions including bullying, intimidating, or harassing any user, 
posting content that is hateful, threatening, or pornographic, incites 
violence, or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.57  As of April 
2009, 150 (18 percent) of the company’s 850 employees focused on 
policing the website for offensive content.58  They would delete photos such 
as a “girl blowing an epic cloud of pot smoke” that violated the social 
norms the company wanted to promote.59  According to an April 2009 
account,60  
 
At Facebook, the range of policed activity is broad. A division called User 
Operations looks at all content that users say is harassing (via "report this" links 
spread liberally throughout the site) or that shows drugs, nudity or pornography. It 
also maintains an extensive "blacklist" of forbidden names that cannot be used to 
make new profiles, like Batman. Some of this monitoring is quite small beer: 
you're not allowed to call someone a "jerk" on Facebook if someone reports it. 
Employees also vigorously enforce their "real-name culture"; they even disabled 
the actress Lindsay Lohan's account in December after discovering that she was 
on the site under an alias. 
 
 The treatment of negative externalities is only one feature that has 
influenced the relative fortunes of Friendster, MySpace, and Facebook. 
However, popular accounts of their downfalls tend to highlight the 
difficulty that Friendster had in dealing with the Fakester problem and the 
reputation that MySpace acquired for having a seedy and unsafe community 
                                                
56 See Facebook Cleanses Pages of Supposed Fakesters, Niall Kennedy’s Weblog, online at 
http://www.niallkennedy.com/blog/2007/12/facebook-pages-deletions.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2011).  Note, however, that Tila Tequila has a fan page (perhaps the name is no longer viewed as 
fake) but with decidedly less provocative pictures than she has on MySpace. 
57 See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (Apr. 26, 2011), online at 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
58 See Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, The Daily Beast (Apr. 30, 2009), online at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/30/walking-the-cyberbeat.html. 
59 See Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, The Daily Beast (Apr. 30, 2009), online at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/30/walking-the-cyberbeat.html. 
60 See Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, The Daily Beast (Apr. 30, 2009), online at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/30/walking-the-cyberbeat.html. 
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MySpace was bought by News Corporation in 2005 for $580 million and 
sold in June 2011 for $35 million.61  Friendster was sold for $26 million in 
2009 and closed down its original site and deleted user profiles in 2011.62  
Facebook displaced MySpace as the leading social network measured by 
users and page views in May 2008.63  As of January 2011 Facebook was 
reported to have a $50-$100 billion market value.64    
One of the major business risks that Facebook faces—and a source 
of continuing controversy—concerns how much control it gives uses over 
the dissemination of private data.65  Users can face adverse effects from 
disclosure while other members of the Facebook platform, such as 
advertisers and application developers, benefit from greater access to data.  
Its governance rules concerning privacy-related negative externalities, and 
its choices relative to new competitors such as Google+, are likely to be 
important.66 
 
 
B.  Stock Exchanges 
 
Modern stock exchanges have detailed rules and regulations that are 
designed to ensure the integrity of their markets.  As Cumming, Johan, and 
Li observe, “Stock exchanges around the world invest considerable 
manpower, technological effort and financial resources to curb market 
manipulation and to promote market efficiency and integrity.”67  They 
                                                
61 See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Emily Steel & Russell Adams, News Corp. Sells Myspace for a 
Song, The Wall Street Journal (Jun. 30, 2011), online at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304584004576415932273770852.html. 
62 See Julianne Pepitone, Friendster Plans To Nuke Its User Data, CNN Money (Apr. 26, 2011, 
2:48 PM), online at http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/26/technology/friendster/index.htm. 
63 See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Overtakes MySpace Globally, ZD Net (Jun. 23, 2008, 9:13 
AM), online at http://www.zdnet.com/news/facebook-overtakes-myspace-globally/207724. 
64 See Ari Levy and Brian Womack, Facebook at $50 Billion Looks More Like Tencent Than 
Google, Bloomberg (Jan. 5, 2011, 11:01 PM), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-
06/facebook-at-50-billion-valuation-is-looking-more-like-tencent-than-google.html. 
65 For a litany of controversies surround Facebook see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Facebook  
66 There is perhaps no better antidote to professional prognostication than the history of social 
networks.  Friendster was a highly praised internet business for much of 2003 before evolving into a 
famous case study of business mistakes. See Danah Boyd, None of this is Real in Joe Karaganis, eds, 
Structures of Participation in Digital Culture 132 (SSRC 2007); Mikolaj Jan Piskorski & Carin-
Isabel Knoop, Friendster (A), Harvard Business Publishing, (2007).  MySpace was then lauded for its 
brilliant effort, in part based on its willingness to let anyone do anything on its site, in displacing 
Friendster.  Commentators thought that it had “won” the race for dominance in social networking. 
See Marc Gunther, News Corp. (hears) MySpace, CNNMoney (Mar. 29, 2006), online at 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/28/technology/pluggedin_fortune/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).  It 
remains to be seen whether Facebook will make the sorts of mistakes in balancing the interests of its 
community—in particular juggling negative and positive externalities that upended its predecessors 
or many other possible business mistakes that could reverse its growth. 
67 See Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan & Dan Li, Exchange trading rules and stock market 
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impose rules concerning market manipulation—that is, doing things to 
artificially affect market signals such as disclosing false information or 
creating a false impression of trading activity.  They also impose rules 
concerning insider trading—that is, using material non-public information. 
Nasdaq, for example, has detailed rules “regarding wash trades, pre-
arranged trading, fictitious orders, giving up priority, churning, front 
running, and a variety of other types of practices.”68 In addition to market 
manipulation rules exchanges have rules for business dealings among 
members including concerning payment and delivery.69  Exchanges enforce 
these rules in a variety of ways including expelling members for violating 
them. 
Unlike the other platforms considered in this article, the governance 
rules for stock exchanges do not entirely result from the voluntary decisions 
of these platforms to deal with negative externalities among platform users.  
While all platforms are required by law to have certain forms of regulation 
(such as selling illegal goods) modern exchanges are subject to extensive 
government laws and regulations But early in their formation stock 
exchanges adopted rules on their own volition, as the history of the London 
Stock Exchange illustrates.  A critical feature in the development of these 
exchanges was the ability to exclude users for bad behavior. 
The securities market in London operated informally for a couple of 
hundred years.70  Securities were traded bilaterally as far back at the 16th 
century.  It was convenient for traders to have places to congregate. They 
initially did so at the Royal Exchange, where commodities were traded, and, 
after being ejected from there as a result of being too rowdy, aggregated 
themselves in some of the coffee houses, such as Jonathan’s Coffee House, 
in the nearby Exchange Alley.  
One of the problems the traders faced was ensuring that exchange 
partners would honor agreements to complete buy and sale orders when 
they came due. The Barnards Act, passed in 1734, however, declared time-
based bargains a form of gambling for which it was not possible to enforce 
contracts. As Michie observes, “It was thus left to the market participants 
themselves to create a code of conduct that enforced the conditions 
necessary for trade.  Even without the legal impediments it was most likely 
that those who participated actively in the market would seek to find a 
solution to their own problems among themselves, without the use of either 
the law of the land or the government.” In the mid 18th century, several 
                                                                                                                       
liquidity, 99 J. FINAN. ECON. 651, 651 (2011). 
68 See Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan & Dan Li, Exchange Trading Rules and Stock Market 
Liquidity, 99 J. FINAN. ECON. 651, 652 (2011). 
69 NYSE, NYSE Rules, online at http://rules.nyse.com/nyse/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
70 This section is based on Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, (Oxford 
1999). 
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groups of traders in financial instruments—including bankers and marine 
underwriters—organized themselves into exclusive associations in which 
members who violated the stated or unstated rules of the association could 
be ejected.  
A group of stockbrokers, who had operated an informal market at 
Jonathan’s Coffee House, tried to do the same in 1761. According to one 
contemporary source,71 
 
The gentlemen at this very period of time … have taken it into their heads that 
some of the fraternity are not so good as themselves ….. and have entered into an 
association to exclude them from J-----‘s coffee-house. 
 
They paid the coffee house for the right to use the premises 
exclusively for three hours a day. As required by that agreement, the master 
of the coffee house, a Mr. Feres,  apparently ejected a Mr. Renoux who then 
sued for assault.  According to the London Chronicle on June 9, 1762,72 
 
It being proved at the trial that the house had been a market (time out of mind) for 
buying and selling government securities, the Jury brought in their verdict for the 
plaintiff, with one shilling damage; by which means Jonathan’s Coffee-house is 
now a free and open market, and all combinations there destroyed. 
  
A group of London stockbrokers had a different approach towards 
an exclusive trading society in 1772.  They funded the construction of a 
new building, the Stock Exchange, for trading.  Given the previous legal 
result they made admission open for a daily fee.  By the late 1790s, with the 
growth in securities market the governing committee of the Stock Exchange 
found that they did not have enough power to enforce discipline and faced 
difficulties in funding the administration of the exchange. The owners of the 
Stock Exchange decided in January 1801 to convert the open exchange into 
a closed “subscription room” for which members paid an annual fee. The 
London Stock Exchange started on March 3, 1801. 
The new exchange adopted regulations for conducting business. 
Michie finds that “adherence to these rules and regulations was monitored 
and adjudicated by a committee, including full-time administrative staff, 
and enforced by the threat of expulsion from the market.”  Most of the 
regulations focused on creating trust among members, particularly 
involving payment and delivery.  As a late 19th century treatise put it, “[The 
London Stock Exchange’s] main objects appear to be the easy and 
                                                
71 See C. F. Smith, The Early History of the London Stock Exchange, 19 AMER. ECON. REV. 206, 
(1929) quoting T. Mortimer, Every Man His Own Broker, 7th ed., 1769, preface, p. viii.   
72 See James Oldham, Law Reporting in the London Newspapers, 1756-1786, 31 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 177, (1987). 
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expeditious transaction of business, and the enforcement of fair dealing 
among its members. To these ends … a set of results formed for the 
admission and expulsion of members, and for the control of their conduct 
both between themselves and towards the public.”73 
The London Stock Exchange, however, was also concerned about 
limiting negative externalities that members could impose on each other 
through market manipulation or asymmetric information. Writing about 
events in 1943, Michie observes, “One of the main functions of the Stock 
Exchange was to ensure a level playing field for all its members in terms of 
equal access to information. Consequently, without any support from the 
government or the Bank of England, it tried to ensure that price-sensitive 
information, such as company results, were released simultaneously to all.”  
The exchange also “treated very seriously any matter of insider trading, 
whether accidental or deliberate.”  In 1943, it expelled one member who 
received tips from a journalist on his stock recommendations.  It also 
warned members about doing business with non-members who raised 
insider-trading concerns.  At least at this time, the government had no 
interest in outlawing insider trading.74 
Stock exchanges, like other platforms, have incentives to deal with 
negative externalities among their members and to maintain the reputation 
of the exchange with the public.  That does not necessarily mean that they 
have adopted the socially optimal governance structure.  Governments, 
especially after the Great Depression, have imposed regulations on stock 
exchanges and also oversee the rules these exchanges adopt themselves. 
There is a long-standing debate on the efficacy of government 
regulation that is beyond the scope of this article.75 The analysis of 
governance mechanisms for multi-sided platforms indicates, however, that 
stock exchanges have incentives to adopt rules and regulations to maximize 
the value of the platform and to do so in part by mitigating negative 
externalities among their members. The analysis of government intervention 
in securities markets should consider whether the government could provide 
tools that would help private enforcement; whether there are aspects of 
private regulation that could be done more efficiently by the government; 
and whether there are deviations between private and public incentives for 
maximizing the value of the platform.  
 
                                                
73  See Rudolph Eyre Melsheimer & Walter Laurence, The Law and Customs of the London stock 
exchange 1 (Nabu 1879). 
74 See Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History 297 (Oxford 1999). 
75 For an important contribution to the literature see Rafael La Porta, R., Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What works in securities laws?, 61 J. FINANCE 1 (2006).  They conclude 
from a study of securities markets in 49 countries that laws facilitating private enforcement through 
disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets but that public enforcement do not. 
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C.  Search Engines 
 
J. C. Penney is an American department store chain that also sells 
online.  In late 2010, and during the holiday shopping season, a user who 
typed in “dresses” would see the company listed first on the Google search 
results page. She would have seen J. C. Penney at or near the top of the list 
for everything from “skinny jeans” to “tablecloths” to “grommet top 
curtains.”76  The company achieved the top spots as a result of a highly 
successful strategy its search engine optimization (SEO) consultant had 
developed. The consultant had inserted these and other terms for J. C. 
Penney products in thousands of web sites along with links back to 
www.jcpenney.com.  The SEO consultant thereby fooled Google’s search 
algorithm into thinking that www.jcpenney.com was a better and more 
relevant website for those search terms than it really was. 
The J. C. Penney strategy is an example of opportunistic behavior 
involving the manipulation of information by websites. It imposes costs on 
the user who engaged in the search and gets distorted information. 
Moreover, the use of the strategies to game the rankings degrades the value 
of search results generally since users have no way of knowing whether any 
particular search result is the result of a manipulated or unmanipulated 
ranking.  J.C. Penney, like other companies, has financial incentives to 
engage in this opportunistic behavior. According to one study, the top spot 
in the search rankings gets more than a third of the clicks compared to about 
17 percent for the second spot and 3 percent for the tenth spot.77 
When it found out about the department store’s strategy, Google 
imposed a penalty on the company. It manually reduced the search rankings 
for J.C. Penney for about 90 days.78 As a result of the manual action J. C. 
Penney fell, to take one example, from the first to the 71st spot for 
“Samsonite carry on luggage.”79  Given the low click rate after the 10th spot 
on the first page downgrading J.C. Penney to the 71st spot was almost the 
same as excluding it from that particular search query result altogether. 
                                                
76 See David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, The New York Times (Feb. 12, 2011), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13search.html?pagewanted=all (last visited 
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Google has developed a sophisticated governance system for 
mitigating negative externalities for its platform community of users, 
websites, and advertisers. 
The core of the Google platform is the search engine. The search 
engine identifies websites and collects various data on these sites. It then 
employs algorithms to rank the relevance of these websites to various 
queries that users enter when they are interested in looking for information 
on the web.80  The websites typically benefit from higher visibility to 
relevant users and therefore have incentives to achieve higher rankings.  
At this point Google faces some difficult tradeoffs.  Given the vast 
amount of information on the web, Google benefits when a website invests 
in activities that make it easier for Google to determine that the website is 
relevant to users that are looking for something. The incentives of users, 
websites, and Google are aligned to a large extent. Users want the most 
relevant information in the least amount of time. Google wants to attract as 
many relevant viewers to its search-results pages (and away from 
competing channels for discovering information such as Bing, Amazon, and 
Facebook) because it makes its money by selling advertisers access to 
relevant viewers.  Websites want to attract relevant users and therefore have 
incentives to design their sites to do so; to the extent they are pursuing that 
goal, their incentives are aligned with those of users and Google. 
As we saw with J.C. Penney, however, websites also have purely 
opportunistic incentives to place higher on search results than other 
websites that are also relevant to those searchers. Moreover, some websites 
may benefit from the small number of clicks they may get from users who 
were not searching for them at all—the spammers’ strategy. 
Google has developed guidelines that describe the “white hat” 
activities that it encourages websites to engage in and the “black hat” 
activities that it believes distort the information-value of results and 
therefore are banned.81  It provides recommendations to webmasters on 
good technical, design and content practices that will benefit website users 
and also help the website signal to the search algorithm that it is a high 
quality and relevant site. This is an example of trying to promote positive 
externalities. 
Google also describes deceptive and manipulative practices that 
could result in Google imposing sanctions on the website. The basic 
principle is that websites are not supposed to do things that are designed to 
influence the search engine results as opposed to providing value to users.  
                                                
80 These algorithms rely heavily on user behavior to ensure that users see the results that are 
most likely to be relevant to their query. See Hal R. Varian, Position Auctions, 25 Int. J. Ind. Organ. 
1163 (2007). 
81 Google, Webmaster Tools Help, online at http://www.google.com/support/webmasters (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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Google then identifies specific practices that websites are not supposed to 
do, including having hidden text or links, cloaking or sneaky redirects, 
loading pages with irrelevant keywords, having multiple pages with 
substantially the same content, and using doorway pages that are just 
created for search engines.82  
The list is not intended to be exhaustive, and Google makes it clear 
that it will take action for any effort to distort search results artificially.83 
 
These quality guidelines cover the most common forms of deceptive or 
manipulative behavior, but Google may respond negatively to other misleading 
practices not listed here (e.g. tricking users by registering misspellings of well-
known websites). It's not safe to assume that just because a specific deceptive 
technique isn't included on this page, Google approves of it. Webmasters who 
spend their energies upholding the spirit of the basic principles will provide a 
much better user experience and subsequently enjoy better ranking than those who 
spend their time looking for loopholes they can exploit.  
 
Google cannot disclose too much about how it detects violations because 
that would enable websites to game the system.84   
Google has a team that focuses on identifying websites that are 
trying to game the system and taking various actions against these websites.  
It appears that Google has adopted a governance system that balances the 
value of providing users access to websites, ensuring the accuracy of the 
rankings, and deterring websites from gaming the system.85  In some cases 
websites appear to be subjected to manual actions that reduce their rankings 
for some period of time.86 In other cases websites are subjected to manual 
actions that reduce their rankings until they apply for reconsideration. That 
seems to have been the case for J.C. Penney, which contacted Google to 
sort through the problem. In other cases websites are delisted altogether 
                                                
82 According to Google, “Doorway pages are typically large sets of poor-quality pages where 
each page is optimized for a specific keyword or phrase. In many cases, doorway pages are written to 
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Web,” The New York Times, November 26, 2010.  A spammers forum, www.blackhatworld.com, 
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86 See What a Google Penalty Looks Like, Mitch Fournier (Jul. 21, 2011), online at 
http://mitchfournier.com/2011/07/21/what-a-google-penalty-looks-like/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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although they have the possibility of applying for reconsideration.  For 
example, BMW.de was delisted in 2006 for using doorway pages.87 
Google’s manual process involves the use of algorithms to detect 
possible violations as well as human decisions on how to respond and 
whether to reconsider.  As the web has expanded it is not feasible for 
Google to rely mainly on this process to ensure the quality of website 
rankings and the mitigate externalities.  There were more than 350 million 
websites as of June 2011 and about 150,000 new websites were appearing 
each day.88  Consequently, Google modifies its search algorithm frequently 
both to improve its performance and to counter efforts to game the 
algorithm.  Changes in the algorithm result in changes in rankings and in 
some cases material changes.  For example, a major change in February 
2011 affected the quality score of 11.8 percent of the queries the Google 
receives.89  As a cross check on the changes to the algorithm Google 
examined the relationship between the websites that were affected by the 
changes in the algorithm and the websites that Chrome browser uses had 
added to their block lists; of several dozen most-blocked domains the 
algorithm changes addressed 84 percent of them.90 
Changes in the algorithm are, in the short run, a zero-sum game for 
websites overall.  Some websites rise in the rankings while others fall.  
Those that rise in the rankings quietly celebrate while some of those who 
fall complain loudly. Those who complain do not necessarily have sound 
grounds. Some of these websites are losing rankings because they have tried 
to game the algorithm and are just suffering the consequences of Google 
catching up to them.  Others are collateral damage from the attempts by 
some websites to artificially inflate their rankings.  In dealing with these 
attempts Google is forced to repeatedly change its algorithm in ways that 
may create uncertainty even for websites that are at least trying to play by 
the rules.  
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Google’s efforts to deal with negative externalities generated by 
websites rest entirely on its ability to exercise property rights over the 
platform.  By delisting websites it can preserve the quality of its rankings as 
well as providing a very significant disincentive to websites engaging in 
repeated attempts to game the system.  By manually reducing website 
rankings it can achieve almost the same result since there is a low value to 
being listed far down in the rankings. And finally, by being able to change 
its algorithm, Google has a scalable approach for mitigating negative 
externalities on a massively large and exponentially expanding platform.  
The upshot is that, over the longer run, the short run zero-sum game 
becomes a significant positive-sum gain for the platform, its users, and also 
for websites, who benefit from the enhanced quality signals the platform – 
here Google—is able to provide. 
  Google’s changes in rankings have resulted in some controversy.  
Several companies have filed antitrust suits against Google for allegedly 
engaging in exclusionary practices or have encouraged governments to 
initiate antitrust investigations.91  There have also been calls for government 
search neutrality regulation92 under which search engines like Google 
would face legal constraints on adjusting results or penalizing websites.  
This topic is addressed further in the next section, which looks at the 
distinction between efforts to use exclusion to police negative externalities 
and the anticompetitive use of exclusionary practices. 
 
                                                
91 See KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc. (“KinderStart”), 2007 WL 831806 (N. D. Cal.); 
Leo Cendrowicz, Carl E. Person v. Google Inc., Case No. 06-7297 JF (RS), 2007 (N. D. Cal); Google 
Inc. v. MyTriggers.com, Inc., Case No. 09 CV 14836, (Franklin County Ct. 2010); TradeComet.com 
LLC v. Google, Inc., 09 CIV 1400 (SDNY 2009); The E.U. Probe: Is Google Rigging Its Search 
Results?, Time (December 2, 2010), online at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2034138,00.html  (last visited August 23, 2011); 
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(February 24, 2010), online at http://www.itproportal.com/2010/02/24/companies-ask-eu-
commission-step-google-search-ranking-complaint/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2011); Claire Cain Miller, 
Texas Probes Google on Ranking of Search Results, The New York Times (September 3, 2010), 
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19-google-kinderstart_x.htm (last visited August 23, 2011); Miguel Helft, Lawsuit Says Google Was 
Unfair to Rival Site (February 17, 2009), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/technology/internet/18google.html (last visited August 22, 
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92 See Adam Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, The New York Times (Dec. 27, 2009), online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). The author is 
the founder of a company that complained to the European Commission that Google’s penalties for 
his site, Foundem, violated the EU’s competition laws.  Also see James Grimmelmann, Some 
Skepticism About Search Neutrality in Adam Marcus, Berin Szoka, eds, The Next Digital Decade: 
Essays on the Future of the Internet, 435 (TechFreedom 2010).  
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D.  Software Platforms 
 
Software platforms provide software code that developers93 can use 
to build applications that run on that platform. Users of the platform then 
have access to these applications.  There are positive feedback effects.  A 
platform that has more users provides developers with a larger market while 
a platform that has more applications provides greater value to users.  
Software platforms underlie a number of multi-sided platform businesses.  
In some cases the software platform is a pure play in the sense that users 
and developers constitute the two primary sides. That is the case with 
Microsoft Windows for personal computers and the Sony PlayStation 
platform for video games. In other cases the software platform is part of a 
mixed platform strategy in which the application side is added to a platform 
based on other sides. That is the case with Facebook, which comprises 
primarily a communication platform, an advertising platform, and a 
software platform. Software platforms are often parts or more complex 
platforms that include hardware, as is the case with the mobile devices and 
video game consoles. 
Negative externalities may arise for software platforms primarily as 
a result of a possible lemons problem.  As in any market, it is possible that 
platform users will purchase applications that do not meet their expectation 
and that they would not have purchased had they had ex ante the knowledge 
they possessed ex post.  The more serious problem is that consumers will 
lower their expectations concerning the quality of applications as a result of 
the proliferation of disappointing applications.  That reduces the incentives 
of developers to invest in high quality applications.  The bad applications 
therefore drive out the good applications. 
The decision by videogame console makers to move from open to 
closed platforms has been attributed to the lemons problem.  According to 
Boudreau and Hagiu,94   
  
In 1983, the videogame market in the United States collapsed, leading to 
bankruptcy for more than 90% of game developers, as well as Atari, manufacturer 
of the dominant game console at the time.  The main reason was a “lemons” 
market failure: because it had not developed technology for locking out 
unauthorized games, Atari was unable to prevent the entry of opportunistic 
                                                
93 Following the usual discussion of software platforms we refer to the “developers” who write 
applications. In fact, there are often entrepreneurs who develop a business idea for a software 
application for a platform. These entrepreneurs may write the code themselves or they may hire 
developers. 
94 For a discussion see Kevin J. Boudreau & Andrei Hagiu, Platforms Rules: Multi-Sided 
Platforms as Regulators in Annabelle Gawer, ed., Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, 163-189, 163 
(Imperial College Business School 2009).   
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developers, who flooded the market with poor quality games. 
 
After this debacle the video game console industry move to closed 
platforms.  This reflected a change in business model in addition to a 
mechanism for dealing with quality.  Before 1983, Atari and other video game 
consoled makers made money by selling their video game consoles, which 
would presumably be more valuable if there were more games.  After 1983, 
most video game console makers required game developers to enter into 
contracts to use the video game console platform.  That enabled them to charge 
video game makers and to impose quality standards.  For example, Microsoft 
Xbox requires game developers to have a contract with it and has an approval 
process for games.95 
  
   
 
V. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE REGULATION OF BAD BEHAVIOR 
ON PLATFORMS 
 
 
Governments have developed extensive responses to bad behavior 
by members of the community.  Criminal law and the police powers of the 
state deal with various actions by members of society that harm others. 
Practices from fraud to insider trading to murder are prohibited.  Common 
law helps regulate negative externalities among agents by enforcing 
property rights and contract rights, and providing incentives to exercise 
care.  Law and economics scholars have argued that much of criminal and 
common law can be interpreted as a rational attempt to maximize social 
welfare.96  Over time governments have adopted regulations and laws to 
deal with various actions that were not (sufficiently) addressed by common 
law.  These range from the regulation of pollution, to lemon laws for the 
sale of used automobiles, to laws against cyber harassment.  Many of these 
laws and regulations have been rationalized along the lines of modern 
welfare economics as solutions to market failures.97 
 The governance mechanisms for private multi-sided platforms 
mirror many of these laws and regulations.  These platforms have 
developed rules and enforcement mechanisms for dealing with negative 
externalities created by agents on their platforms.  These range from efforts 
                                                
95 See Developing Games for Xbox, Xbox, online at http://www.xbox.com/en-
US/developers/xbox360/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).  
96 See Richard A. Posner, 4 ed., Economic Analysis of Law 375 - 380 (Little, Brown and 
Company 1992). 
97 See W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & John M. Vernon, 4 ed., Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust (MIT 2005). 
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to keep the platforms safe from sexual predators, cyber harassment 
including hate speech, pornography, the under-provision of information 
including lemons problems, market manipulation, fraud and 
misrepresentation, and opportunistic distortion of information.  
These efforts likely provide enormous social value, since some of 
these platforms would provide significantly poorer service and perhaps not 
even be viable in the absence of efforts to control negative externalities.  
For example, as of the middle of 2011 there were more than 750 million 
Facebook users who spend 11.7 billion hours a month on the site and 
presumably value doing so rather than spending their time on a number of 
other alternatives.98 This platform has been successful at least in part 
because it provided a safer place than competing social networks did. 
The governance of negative externalities by multi-sided platforms 
nevertheless raises two public policy issues—anticompetitive exclusion and 
the role of public versus private regulation.  Both issues result from the 
exercise of bouncer’s rights to enforce rules to mitigate putative negative 
externalities. We already saw that the English courts prohibited the traders 
who rented the premises of Jonathan’s Coffee House from excluding other 
traders.  However, the issue is likely to have increased prominence as a 
result of several multi-sided platforms having created highly successful 
global businesses.  These include Apple, eBay, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, NYSE/Euronext, and Visa. 
    
A.  Negative Externalities and Anticompetitive Exclusion   
 
When a firm, especially one with significant market power, excludes 
another firm from the market its actions may be subject to scrutiny under 
the antitrust laws.99 In the United States exclusionary practices could be a 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits attempts to 
create or maintain a monopoly, or in certain circumstances Section 1, which 
prohibits unreasonable agreements in restraint of trade. In the European 
Union exclusionary practices could be considered abuses of dominance 
under the Article 102 TFEU. 
  As antitrust has adopted a more economics-based approach some 
aspects of exclusionary abuse claims have been viewed as problematic or at 
least controversial.100 The U.S. courts have expressed skepticism over 
                                                
98 See Facebook, Statistics, online at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
99 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, ed. 2, Global Antitrust Law and Economics 
(Foundation 2011). 
100 The U.S. courts in particular have been influenced by the findings of economists that firms 
engage in vertical foreclosure practices for procompetitive reasons.  See Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S 877 (2007); AMICUS CURIAE Brief of Economists in Support 
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vertical restraint cases101 and monopoly leveraging.102 They have generally 
rejected claims premised on the exclusion of a competitor from access to 
property owned by the defendant.103 The U.S. courts have also expressed 
skepticism over claims involving the exclusion of direct competitors such as 
those that stem from the improvement of a product.104 In fact, they have 
raised the bar for some practices sufficiently high that they are effectively 
(if not literally) per se legal under the rule of reason; for example it is 
extremely difficult for a plaintiff to establish that a rival that has “priced 
low” has engaged in predatory pricing.105 
  The European Union has also made some moves in this direction. 
The Commission guidelines on enforcement priorities for Article 82 (now 
Article 102 TFEU) recognizes that vertical and horizontal exclusionary 
practices should be subject to the rule of reason and that depending on the 
factual circumstances a firm with significant market power may not have 
the ability or incentives to foreclose a rival.106 The European Union 
continues to mandate access to essential facilities but imposes a significant 
burden of persuasion on the parties demanding access. 
 Nevertheless, it is possible that firms with significant market power 
may engage in anticompetitive exclusion. The question addressed here is 
how the exclusionary conduct cases that result from the imposition of 
penalties under established multi-sided platform governance systems on 
firms should be handled. 
 A platform could invoke negative externalities in excluding a 
possible rival from access to its platform.  If it does not have a governance 
system in operation, and exclusion of the competitor is based on an 
idiosyncratic decision rather than a systematic process for dealing with 
negative externalities, there is no reason, based on the analysis above, to 
                                                                                                                       
of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S 877 (2007), (No. 06-
480). 
101 Herbert Hovenkamp & Phillip E. Areeda, Fundamentals of Antitrust Low, 3 ed. (Aspen 
2004); Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, ed. 2, Global Antitrust Law and Economics (Foundation  
2011). 
102 Herbert Hovenkamp & Phillip E. Areeda, Fundamentals of Antitrust Low, 3 ed., (Aspen 
2004); Elhauge and Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, ed. 2, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, 
(Foundation  2011). 
103 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S 398 
(2003). 
104 See Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc., v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 F.3d 991, (9th 
Cir. 2010).  
105 Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the 
Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 435 (2006). 
106 See, Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (EC) to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertaking, European Commission Competition (Mar. 2008), 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html (last visited Aug 1, 2011). Also 
see Steven C. Sunshine, Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, U.S Dept. of Justice (Apr. 5. 1995), 
online at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2215.pdf. 
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evaluate the conduct differently than other exclusionary conduct allegations.  
The court should take the efficiency explanation offered by the defendant 
on board in weighing the pro-competitive and anticompetitive aspects of the 
practice, or in applying the otherwise applicable legal framework.107 Absent 
strong evidence that the business justification is without basis and that the 
harm to competition in the market as a whole is serious, the courts have 
recognized that even dominant firms should be given significant leeway in 
the manner in which they choose to compete. 108 
It is now widely accepted that antitrust rules should take into 
account the costs and likelihood of making mistakes.109  Rules that tend to 
absolve firms that have engaged in anticompetitive practices can encourage 
more firms to engage in these practices.  Rules that tend to condemn firms 
for engaging in practices that are pro-competitive can deter firms from 
advancing social welfare. 
That balance between false positives and false negatives is 
especially critical when the challenged action of the platform is taken 
pursuant to a pre-existing governance system. The fact that a firm is a 
platform and has a governance system for dealing with negative 
externalities provides a strong presumption that the firm is increasing social 
welfare by policing bad behavior pursuant to that governance system on its 
platform.  That is likely to be an extremely valuable service to the 
consumers on the various sides of the platform.  The ability to exclude those 
who create negative externalities is critical to the functioning of that 
governance system and ultimately for the overall value of the platform. 
Of course, it is possible that a platform has established or structured 
a governance system as a pretext for excluding competitors. A platform 
could establish rules that prohibit, at least under some circumstances, 
participants from relying on, or interconnecting, with other platforms.  Prior 
to its break-up, for example, AT&T provided local and long-distance 
telephone service under public utility rate regulation and had an unregulated 
equipment manufacturer. It established rules concerning the interconnection 
of equipment and other services to its networks that it claimed were 
designed to ensure the integrity of the telephone system.  It has been argued, 
at least, that it sometimes applied these rules to exclude competing 
equipment manufacturers and competing long-distance telephone service 
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109 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, (2nd ed. 
2011); Herbert Hovenkamp & Phillip E. Areeda, Fundamentals of Antitrust Low, 3 ed., (Aspen 
2004); Einer Elhauge& Damien Geradin, ed. 2, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, (Foundation  
2011). David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same 
Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INTL. L. 161 (2009); Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision 
Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 41 (1999 – 2000).  
38 Bad Behavior on Multi-Sided Platforms [26-August 2011]  
providers in violation of the antitrust laws.110  To settle an antitrust case 
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, AT&T agreed to divest its local 
operating companies and its equipment manufacturer.111  Therefore, the 
existence of a governance system should not, by itself, preclude a finding of 
anticompetitive exclusion. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the governance system increases the 
likelihood that the practice that results in exclusion is, in fact, pro-
competitive. Governance systems are common among platforms, are clearly 
necessary for dealing with negative externalities, and can increase consumer 
welfare. To the extent there are serious negative externality problems on the 
platform there is a high cost to false positive decisions. That is, antitrust 
decisions that prohibit firms from engaging in exclusion, when that 
exclusion is pro-consumer and/or pro-competitive, would impose 
significant costs on the platform at issue, because the platform will be 
forced to weaken its enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, other platforms 
will recognize the risks they take from using exclusion to police negative 
externalities and weaken their government systems to the overall detriment 
of platform customers. 
The 1762 decision concerning Jonathan’s Coffee House illustrates the 
dangers of limiting the ability of private platforms to exercise bouncer’s 
rights to regulate their platforms. That decision deterred the emergence of a 
stock exchange in England for a decade. When a stock exchange was 
created it had to adopt ineffective methods for dealing with negative 
externalities among members as a result of the court ruling. It was not until 
40 years after the decision that England had a stock exchange that could 
effectively regulate bad behavior among members. The error-cost analysis 
of governance systems indicates that the standard rule of reason approach 
should be modified in the same way, and for similar reasons, as that 
approach has been modified for other practices that are likely to be pro-
competitive.112 There should be a presumption that exclusion that results 
from an established governance system for dealing with negative 
externalities is pro-competitive. The plaintiff should bear the burden of 
persuasion of showing otherwise. 
We assume the plaintiff has already met the usual burden of 
establishing a relevant market and, as applicable, the potential for the 
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challenged practice to raise price or restrict output.  In the first step of the 
analysis, in defending against the complainant’s prima facie case, the 
platform should have the opportunity to demonstrate that it has established a 
governance system for dealing with negative externalities and that the 
practice at issue results from the exercise of that governance system. If the 
platform cannot do so, standard antitrust rules applicable to the practice at 
issue should apply (see step three). If the platform can do so, the analysis 
should move to the second step. 
The second step should consider whether the exclusion is 
inconsistent with the use of the governance system to deal with negative 
externalities or whether the governance system itself has been established as 
a pretext for excluding competitors. The plaintiff should bear the burden of 
demonstrating that the invocation by the defendant of the governance 
system is not reasonably related to enforcement of the goals the governance 
mechanism is designed to achieve. The plaintiff may be able to show that 
the platform has applied the rules differentially—excluding a competitor 
when it would not have ordinarily excluded the firm that allegedly violated 
the rules—or has created a separate class of offenses that really just results 
in the exclusion of competitors.  The plaintiff may also be able to show that 
the governance system is unrelated to the correction of negative 
externalities or established as a pretext for exclusion. The plaintiff’s claim 
should be rejected unless it can demonstrate that the practice is inconsistent 
with the mitigation of negative externalities. Otherwise the analysis should 
proceed to the third step. 
 The third step, which would be arrived at if the defendant fails the 
first step or the plaintiff succeeds in the second step, would follow the 
standard antitrust analysis applicable to the challenged conduct at issue.  In 
the United States that would involve analyzing whether the practice (i) 
forecloses or raises rivals’ costs in a manner that enhances the defendant’s 
ability to raise price or restrict market output to the detriment of consumers 
and then (ii) weighing the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects to 
determine whether the practice is, on net, anticompetitive.  Under many 
circumstances, a successful showing by the complainant under step two 
would demonstrative the lack of pro-competitive effects. 
 As with any error-cost based approach this three-step analysis 
cannot eliminate false positives and false negatives.  The plaintiff might 
succeed in showing that the application of an exclusionary penalty is a 
pretext even though it is a valid attempt to eliminate a negative externality. 
A defendant might succeed in showing that an exclusionary penalty is part 
of a pro-competitive governance system when in fact it is designed to 
exclude a competitor and harm consumers.  Nevertheless, the approach 
likely minimizes the likelihood and costs of errors, in light of the role of 
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governance systems in reducing negative externalities that would otherwise 
harm consumers.  
 
B.    Private vs. Public Regulation 
 
Another issue is whether private platforms should be running their 
own governance systems at all.  Facebook, for example, is regulating social 
behavior for a community that has a population that is twice as large as the 
United States.  Should Facebook be regulating the pictures that people show 
their friends or what they can say to each other? 
This raises the tradeoff between the social control of businesses 
through public or private mechanisms when both are subject to 
imperfection.113  Public control is subject to a myriad of breakdowns in the 
political process that leads to the passage of laws, imperfections in the 
government institutions for social control including regulatory capture, and 
unintended consequences from what are often rigid methods of control 
mandated by law.  Private control is subject to the problem that for-profit 
firms, including multi-sided platforms, do not necessarily have the 
incentives to maximize social welfare and may in fact have incentives to 
reduce social welfare, for example by exercising market power.114 As noted 
above, a platform could even adopt rules as a pretext to exclude 
competitors. 
Multi-sided platforms do, however, have incentives to maximize the 
value of their platforms to the community. They may not necessarily 
achieve exactly the same maximum as a social planner would. But since 
they obtain their profits through the extraction of value from the platform 
they have strong incentives to increase platform value.  They also have 
incentives to reduce negative externalities. The review of multi-sided 
platforms above shows that many platforms have, in fact, erected 
sophisticated governance mechanisms to do so.  Given those incentives, 
regulators should be skeptical of claims that the outcome of a governance 
system decision in fact reflects an effort to limit competition by the 
platform’s rivals rather than a legitimate effort to maintain or increase the 
value of the platform to its ecosystem. 
Multi-sided platforms have several advantages over public 
regulators.  They have more information on practices that may lead to 
negative externalities and the impact on the community.  As private firms 
they can make decisions quickly on how to deal with negative externalities 
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and modify practices quickly especially if they observe unintended 
consequences.  As mentioned earlier the platforms lack some of the 
investigative methods and penalties that a public enforcer would have.  But 
they also face fewer constraints—for better or worse—since they are not 
subject to due process or administrative procedure requirements. 
The issue of public versus private control has recently come up in 
proposals for search neutrality.  The argument is that the government should 
prohibit search engines from “manipulating” search results and that all 
search results should be presented based on a governmentally determined 
notion of relevance.  These proposals are, not surprisingly, being advanced 
by websites that have had changes in their rankings as a result of manual 
downgrading or algorithmic changes.115  Such prohibitions would limit the 
use of bouncer’s rights to penalize websites that are trying to game the 
system. They would also limit search engine innovations to improve 
algorithms, since anyone whose rankings change could claim that the 
algorithm has not changed neutrally, and government regulation could 
impose substantial social costs both by requiring potentially slow and 
expensive regulatory review and by making false-positive findings of 
“manipulation” based on differences in complex and potentially subjective 
judgments of “relevance.”116  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Multi-sided platforms have become particularly prominent since the 
start of the commercial web, although this business model has been around 
for millennia.117  The Internet and web technologies facilitate the creation of 
platforms—intermediaries—for different types of users that would benefit 
from getting together.118 As a result of scale economies and the ability to 
either replicate platforms across geographies, or to connect global 
communities, some of these platforms have become global players.  These 
platforms are likely to attract increasing attention from policymakers 
because of their economic and social significance. Several already have. 
 An essential feature of these platforms is that they promote positive 
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externalities between members of the community. But as with any 
community there are numerous opportunities for people and businesses to 
generate negative externalities that can reduce economic efficiency and, in 
the extreme, lead to the tragedy of the commons. 
 Most discussions of these platforms have focused on how multi-
sided platforms create value by harnessing positive externalities and how 
positive network effects can result in the emergence of dominant platforms 
in particular categories.  Much less attention has been given to the role these 
platforms play in mitigating negative externalities.  As it turns out, many of 
these platforms have developed governance systems for dealing with bad 
behavior. These governance systems ultimately depend on the ability of the 
platform to exclude agents from some quantum of the platform including 
prohibiting them from the platform entirely.  
Exercising these exclusionary rights results in controversy. The 
platform has to balance the interests of its multiple constituents.  Rules 
concerning negative externalities, just as those involving positive ones, shift 
value between different sides.  Like any polity, a platform must balance 
competing values, such as freedom of speech and protection from hate 
speech and other verbal harassment.  The exercise of exclusionary rights to 
enforce rules also can lead to complaints by the excluded parties and in 
some cases lawsuits. 
 Generally, it is desirable from the standpoint of social welfare to 
have private multi-sided platforms deal with negative externalities.  They 
can increase the value of their platforms to their communities by doing so, 
and facilitate growth, development, innovation and adoption of platforms 
that generate enormous consumer welfare.   While neither private nor social 
control of bad behavior on platforms is likely to lead to the socially optimal 
result that an all-seeing and all-powerful planner could achieve, private 
control will often be superior to public control.  The platform can identify 
problems more easily and can correct these problems with greater agility 
and is in a better position to minimize the unintended consequences of rules. 
The fact that a platform is engaging in exclusion as part of a 
governance system for dealing with negative externalities has important 
implications for the antitrust analysis of exclusion. “Exclusion” of actors 
who diminish the value of the platform to all its constituents is prevalent, 
important, and beneficial.  Antitrust analysis should therefore use exclusion 
based on a governance system for dealing with negative externalities as a 
screen for practices that are likely to be pro-competitive, and recognize that 
condemning the implementation of governance systems, as a general matter, 
is likely to create false positives.  The three-step analysis proposed above 
would better balance the costs of false positives and false negatives in light 
of the common use of governance systems to mitigate negative externalities 
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and increase consumer welfare in platform communities. 
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